I. 执行摘要
本报告旨在深入剖析在假想的“热战”情境下，中美两国除武器系统之外的国家实力对比。分析涵盖了政治、经济、文化、工业水平及战争潜力等多个维度，旨在为高级战略决策者和研究人员提供全面、客观的评估。
分析显示，美国在政治体系上虽面临两极分化挑战，但其民主制度的内在韧性及广泛的盟友网络仍构成重要优势，尽管“美国优先”政策可能引发盟友对其长期承诺的疑虑。中国则凭借其高度集中的政治体制，在危机初期展现出快速决策和资源调动的能力，但缺乏自下而上的反馈机制可能限制其在长期冲突中的适应性。
经济方面，美国以服务业为主导的消费驱动型经济，在全球供应链中断时可能面临通胀和民生压力。中国庞大的工业生产能力是其战争潜力的基石，但其出口导向型经济模式和房地产及地方债务问题，使其在面对经济战时可能面临内部不稳的风险。
文化层面，美国的内部文化分歧可能被对手利用以削弱国内凝聚力，而其软实力的减弱可能影响国际支持。中国则能通过民族主义叙事凝聚民心，但过度依赖信息控制可能导致在战事不利时民意迅速反转，影响社会稳定。
工业能力上，中国作为全球制造业中心，拥有显著的生产优势和军民融合战略，能够迅速扩大军工生产。然而，其在高端技术领域对外部的依赖仍是潜在弱点。美国虽然制造业外流，但其创新能力和国防工业基础的调整潜力不容忽视，尽管其产能和熟练劳动力面临挑战。
在战争潜力方面，两国都拥有庞大的人力资源。美国在能源和粮食储备方面具有优势，但供应链韧性面临挑战。中国则在稀土等关键矿产上占据主导地位，并积极构建能源和粮食安全体系。网络和空间领域已成为新的战场，两国都在积极发展相关能力，并可能对军事行动和关键基础设施造成深远影响。
总体而言，两国在潜在冲突中均拥有独特的优势和显著的弱点。美国的优势在于其盟友体系、金融韧性和技术创新前沿，但其国内政治分裂和工业基础空心化是其挑战。中国的优势在于其庞大的工业生产能力、统一的政治意志和对关键资源的控制，但其经济结构性问题、对外部市场的依赖以及信息控制的潜在弊端是其劣势。一场“热战”将是代价高昂的，并可能对全球秩序产生深远影响。
II. 导言
A. 目的与范围
本报告旨在对美国和中国在假想的“热战”情境下，除直接武器系统对比之外的国家实力进行基础性评估。分析将聚焦于支撑国家力量的深层维度，包括政治稳定性、经济韧性、文化凝聚力、工业生产能力以及整体战争潜力。本报告的目标是为高级战略决策者和研究人员提供一个全面、客观且具权威性的视角，以期为战略规划提供参考。
B. 中美关系的背景
作为全球最大的发达国家和发展中国家，中美关系正经历日益加剧的战略竞争，这体现在经济、技术和地缘政治等多个领域。这种竞争已演变为贸易争端、技术脱钩尝试以及台湾海峡等关键区域军事活动的加剧。在评估任何潜在的大规模冲突的长期可持续性和结果时，理解国家力量的非军事基础至关重要。
III. 政治 (Political Landscape)
A. 治理与决策
美国
美国实行民主制度，其固有的制衡机制旨在防止权力过度集中。然而，这一体系目前正面临严重的政治两极分化挑战。这种两极分化导致对立政党之间出现尖锐的、对抗性的分歧，阻碍了有效治理并滋生了不信任。公共讨论变得日益对立，妥协被视为软弱的表现。
在危机中，民主国家通常因需要讨论和达成共识而显得决策缓慢。然而，有学术观点认为，民主制度通过其制度灵活性、问责制和信息流动，在应对紧急情况和危机时拥有独特的资源。但当前美国的高度两极分化可能会阻碍其在危机中迅速采取统一行动。这种政治两极分化可能导致“我们与他们”的心态，并使得妖魔化对手变得更容易。虽然在应对国内动乱时，公众对军事部署的支持出人意料地没有明显的党派偏见，但更深层次的社会分歧可能会削弱在长期对外冲突中所需的国家团结。美国军方本身倾向于抵制国内部署，这表明一种可能与危机期间政治压力相冲突的专业规范。因此，高度两极分化的国内环境可能会导致对战争目标和维持战争的公众共识出现碎片化，从而削弱长期冲突所需的政治意愿，即使最初的军事行动获得了广泛支持。这种内部摩擦可能比外部威胁更为显著的脆弱性。
中国
中国实行高度集中的一党制威权体制，中国共产党（CCP）保持着严密的控制。中国战略家认为，他们能够通过一套高度程序化、科学化的方法有效控制军事升级的各个方面并管理危机。这种对理论的过度依赖可能导致他们对在冲突中取胜过于自信，从而增加中美军事对抗中升级的风险。
尽管该体制在职业激励和长期决策方面具有优势，但它缺乏自下而上的问责制和制度化的监督机制，这使得错误或权力滥用难以迅速被发现和纠正。这可能导致在危机中出现过度反应，并且与更开放的系统相比，系统韧性较弱。中国高度集中的体制可能在冲突初期实现快速决策和资源调动。然而，缺乏健全的内部反馈机制和对异议的压制 可能会阻碍在长期、不可预测的冲突中进行适应性学习和纠正。危机中的“过度反应”倾向 可能导致误判或在面对不可预见的挑战时无法调整战略，从而可能延长冲突或加剧其代价。因此，尽管表面上果断，但中国体制的僵化和信息扭曲的潜在风险可能成为其在动态、高风险“热战”中的关键弱点，因为持续的适应和准确的信息流动至关重要。
B. 国际联盟与外交影响力
美国
美国拥有广泛的外交关系和正式条约网络，包括北约、美洲国家组织、北美防空司令部（与加拿大）和澳新美安全条约（与澳大利亚和新西兰）。这些联盟被视为威慑战争和赢得冲突的关键。印太地区的美国盟友是其维持地区稳定和威慑侵略战略的基石，它们提供进入、互操作性和共享能力，从而扩大了美国的力量。美国在全球拥有超过800个军事基地。
然而，人们对美国对多边主义的承诺存在疑虑，认为其具有矛盾性和选择性，倾向于在国际条约中采取“例外主义”立场。某些政府推行的“美国优先”方针可能导致盟友出现“措手不及”的感觉，引发对美国可靠性的质疑，并可能为对手填补权力真空创造机会。例如，冻结对外援助等近期行动正在侵蚀信任和伙伴关系。尽管美国拥有广泛的联盟并从中获得显著的军事和经济利益，但其历史上在“孤立主义和全面参与之间摇摆不定”的特点 加上近期“美国优先”政策的影响，可能会使盟友对在长期“热战”中获得持续支持产生不确定性。盟友可能会因认为美国不可靠或冲突代价过高而犹豫是否全面投入，这可能导致盟友阵线的瓦解。因此，美国联盟的实力不仅取决于军事互操作性，还取决于对长期政治承诺和共同分担责任的认知，尤其是在冲突给盟友带来严重经济或社会代价时。
中国
中国正在加强与俄罗斯、伊朗和朝鲜等国的关系，这些关系虽然不像北约那样制度化，但已在相互支持军事努力方面展现出强大实力。中国还与尼日利亚等国建立了“全面战略伙伴关系”，包括军事支持和培训。中国通过深入的外交接触和“一带一路”倡议等全球性举措，积极提升其国际影响力，尤其是在利用对美国主导的世界秩序的不满情绪方面。“一带一路”倡议为众多国家，特别是发展中国家，提供了基础设施建设和经济机遇，提升了中国作为负责任全球行为体的形象。
中国通过文化输出（电影、电视剧、游戏）、数字平台、语言推广、技术进步（人工智能、5G、绿色技术）以及积极外交（“一带一路”、维和、人道主义援助）精心培育其软实力。中国拥有全球最大的外交网络。然而，这些努力面临数据隐私、审查制度、人权和知识产权保护等方面的批评，这些都对其全球形象构成了持续挑战。一些评论认为，中国的软实力是基于操纵而非真正的说服。中国对国际秩序的方针旨在降低其对美国力量的脆弱性，并增加其行动自由，强调主权和不干涉等威斯特伐利亚原则。它已采取限制关键矿产出口等措施，以应对美国的关税和出口管制。
虽然中国日益壮大的战略伙伴关系和经济杠杆（“一带一路”）使其在和平时期扩大了全球影响力，但这些关系往往是交易性的，缺乏北约等传统联盟所具备的深层意识形态一致性或共同防御义务。在“热战”中，这种伙伴关系的可靠性，尤其是在面临严重经济压力或直接军事威胁时，仍值得怀疑。各国可能因经济利益而与中国结盟，但可能不会提供无条件的军事支持。因此，中国的外交影响力，虽然在不断扩大，但在确保与美国及其盟友直接“热战”中获得广泛、无条件的军事支持方面，可能不如其在和平时期竞争或灰色地带冲突中有效。“操纵”其软实力 的方面表明，在真正的国际危机中，其建立国际团结的基础可能不够坚实。
C. 国内稳定与凝聚力
美国
政治两极分化在美国的社会和政治结构中造成了深刻裂痕，相当一部分党派将对方视为对国家福祉的威胁。这种“我们与他们”的心态使得妥协变得难以实现，并可能在重大冲突中阻碍国家团结。美国军队的单位凝聚力，即士兵之间在压力下维持意志和承诺的纽带，一直是争议的焦点，尤其是在种族和性别融合方面。社会吸引力、群体声望和任务承诺是凝聚力的关键因素。
美国社会中存在的文化冲突（例如，传统价值观与进步价值观、移民、性别角色之间的冲突） 可能被利用来制造政治目的的内部群体和外部群体。中国积极寻求影响美国公众舆论和文化，旨在播撒疑虑和制造分裂，包括通过支持某些电影来制造美日盟友之间的分歧。在“热战”中，这些预先存在的国内文化和政治分歧 可能被对手利用，以削弱对战争努力的公众支持，并削弱国家决心。因此，美国国内政治和文化的分裂可能是一个显著的脆弱点，可能限制政府维持长期、高成本冲突所需的持续公众支持和国家团结的能力。
中国
维持社会稳定是中国共产党（CCP）的首要任务，尤其考虑到中国的人口结构趋势（劳动力老龄化、低出生率）给经济生产力和社会稳定带来的压力。中国经济面临房地产危机、消费需求下降和地方政府高额债务等挑战。报告指出，工厂倒闭、大规模裁员和工人抗议工资问题等现象正在发生。此外，也有关于针对政府的公开抗议和对领导层不满的报道。长期的经济低迷可能导致停滞不前，并考验中国共产党维持控制的能力。
中国民族主义深深植根于被外国列强“羞辱和屈辱”的历史叙事中，中国共产党声称已克服了这一时期，从而使其统治和领土主张合法化。这种叙事是动员公众支持对抗外部威胁的有力工具。“百年国耻”的叙事是中国政治环境的核心，并影响着其外交关系。它可以被用来团结民众并为强硬行动辩护。中国共产党对信息和媒体保持严格控制，塑造公众舆论并压制异议。这种控制体现在压制批评和阻止调查的努力中。
虽然民族主义可以成为中国强大的团结力量，尤其是在面对外部威胁时，但长期的经济困难 和日益增长的社会不满 可能会侵蚀中国共产党的合法性，因为其合法性部分与经济表现相关。在“热战”中，经济中断（制裁、封锁）将加剧这些问题，可能导致普遍的社会动荡并挑战中国共产党的控制。因此，中国内部稳定，虽然由于中央集权控制看似坚固，但在重大冲突的经济后果面前可能显得异常脆弱，可能导致内部挑战，从而分散战争努力的资源和注意力。
IV. 经济 (Economic Foundations)
A. 经济规模与结构
美国
2024年，美国经济总量约为29.2万亿美元，年增长率为2.8%。美国拥有多元化、高度发达且由私营部门主导的经济，其特点是高生产力、技术创新和竞争力。服务业占GDP（2021年为76.7%）和就业的很大一部分，其中私人消费占2022年GDP的68.0%。美国经济主要由消费驱动。
一个消费驱动型经济 严重依赖商品的可用性，其中许多是进口的。在“热战”中，全球供应链的中断 将直接影响消费品价格和供应，可能导致通货膨胀和消费者信心下降。这可能造成国内经济不稳定，正如关税的影响所显示。因此，虽然强大的消费基础是和平时期的优势，但在供应链被切断且国内生产无法迅速弥补进口损失时，它可能成为战时脆弱点，导致公众不满。
中国
2025年，中国经济按购买力平价（PPP）计算预计将超过美国，达到约35.29万亿美元。中国经济的发展在很大程度上得益于其庞大的工业部门，2023年工业增加值占GDP的近40%，是美国的两倍多。中国是全球最大的工业生产国。中国正达到其投资驱动型增长模式的极限，家庭消费显著滞后（2023年占GDP的39%，而美国为68%）。尽管政府努力，但由于房地产脆弱性、债务和通货紧缩风险，消费依然疲软。
中国庞大的工业生产能力 显然是战时生产和动员的优势。然而，其历史上对出口的依赖 和投资驱动型增长 意味着，国际贸易的重大中断（例如，封锁、制裁）可能导致产能过剩、工厂倒闭和失业率上升。这将加剧现有的国内消费疲软和债务问题。因此，虽然中国的工业实力为军事生产提供了坚实基础，但其经济结构对外部市场和投资的依赖可能使其在面对经济战时容易受到攻击，从而引发内部经济不稳定和社会动荡。
表：中美GDP对比 (2024-2025)
| 指标 | 美国 (2024/2025) | 中国 (2024/2025) |
| 名义GDP (万亿美元) | 29.2 (2024) | 18.685 (2024) |
| PPP GDP (万亿美元) | 25.051 (2024), 25.727 (2025预测) | 32.830 (2024), 34.340 (2025预测) |
| GDP年增长率 (%) | 2.8 (2024) | 5.0 (2024) |
| 第一产业占GDP比重 (%) | 0.9 (2021) | 6.8 (2024) |
| 第二产业占GDP比重 (%) | 18 (2023) | 36.5 (2024) |
| 第三产业占GDP比重 (%) | 77 (2023) | 56.7 (2024) |
B. 贸易与全球供应链影响
美国
几十年来，美国经济的工业基础已空心化，变得依赖复杂的全球供应链。许多美国中小企业依赖中国低成本、快速的制造能力和物流系统。对中国商品征收的关税增加了美国消费者和企业的成本。这可能导致对美国制造商品的需求减少，并引发通货膨胀。企业不得不转移制造基地，这需要时间和投资成本，并面临质量和效率的不稳定冲击。
美国正在利用关税和补贴推动企业转向国内或盟友生产，旨在建立一个有韧性的经济基础。重点在于通过国内制造和战略性产业政策加强关键供应链，包括能源、农业、医疗产品和国防。美国对全球化供应链的依赖，特别是对关键零部件的依赖，意味着任何中断（例如，封锁或对物流的网络攻击）都可能严重影响其维持军事行动和维护国内稳定的能力。明确提出“重建足够的国内能力以维持关键部门”的目标 表明其认识到当前的脆弱性。因此，尽管美国正在努力实现回流和多元化，但其现有的与全球供应链，特别是与中国的深度融合，在“热战”情境下对美国构成了显著的战略脆弱性，可能同时影响军事准备和民生。
中国
中国经济根本上依赖出口。2024年，中国对美国的出口额就超过5000亿美元，占其总出口的16.4%。中国积极多元化其出口渠道，并推动数字贸易和绿色贸易，以增强其抵御外部冲击的韧性。它还加速了向越南和墨西哥等国的海外制造业转移，以规避关税。中国全面的国内制造体系和产业集群提供了独特的优势。
美国关税导致中国对美出口减少，影响了相关产业（例如，纺织、电子、汽车）并造成失业。作为报复，中国也征收了自己的关税，并限制了关键矿产的出口。中美两国在经济上深度交织，全面脱钩的代价极其高昂。中国对关键矿产的控制 及其在全球制造业中的核心地位 使其能够“武器化”其供应链主导地位。例如，限制稀土出口直接威胁到美国的高科技和军事供应链。这造成了一种“迂回依赖”，即美国去中国化供应链的努力可能仍然依赖中国的中间产品。因此，一场“热战”将把经济相互依存从稳定因素转变为主要的冲突领域，双方都将利用其供应链的“掐脖子”点来造成最大的经济损害，并扰乱对方的工业和军事生产。
C. 金融韧性与国家债务
美国
美国国债市场虽表现出一定韧性，但在2020年新冠疫情爆发等危机期间也出现了“严重功能障碍”。人们担心，在“现金荒”时期，交易商的资产负债表不足以有效撮合市场。美国国债在2025年5月达到36.22万亿美元（占GDP的124%），创二战以来的新高。国债利息支付预计将超过国防开支。高债务水平降低了应对威胁或经济衰退时的财政灵活性。
不断升级的国债及其偿债成本 构成了显著的战略制约。在“热战”中，巨额的军事开支将进一步推高赤字，可能导致财政危机，动摇对美国国债的信心，并危及美元的储备货币地位。这将限制美国为长期战争提供资金和应对不可预见经济冲击的能力。因此，尽管美国金融实力雄厚，但日益沉重的债务负担可能削弱其在长期冲突中进行持续经济动员和发挥全球领导力的能力。
中国
中国金融市场面临外部冲击（如贸易摩擦、新冠疫情）和内部问题（如2015年股市崩盘）的严峻挑战。然而，中国金融市场占GDP的比重相对较小（60%对美国140%），且实行资本管制，这可能在一定程度上抵御资本外逃。中国经济受到房地产危机、消费需求下降和地方政府高额债务的困扰。官方财政赤字约为GDP的3%，但包括表外资金在内的扩大化数据表明，2025年可能达到GDP的8.5-9%，2026年可能更高。
中国政府能够迫使银行承担更多借贷，但这严重限制了银行向促进增长的领域贷款的能力，并影响其资本充足率。央行已宣布稳定金融市场和释放流动性的措施。尽管对金融市场实行国家控制和资本管制可能在一定程度上抵御外部冲击，但房地产危机和地方政府债务等深层问题 构成了显著的系统性风险。在“热战”中，巨额战时融资需求可能加剧这些脆弱性，如果国家吸收损失的能力被压垮，可能导致信贷紧缩和资产价格下跌。因此，中国的金融体系，尽管受到国家控制，但面临深层次的结构性问题，这些问题在长期冲突中可能受到严峻考验，从而可能导致金融危机，削弱其为战争提供资金和维持社会稳定的能力。
V. 文化 (Cultural Dynamics)
A. 国家士气与公众对冲突的支持
美国
公众对国内动乱中军事部署的态度出人意料地坚韧且无党派偏见，大多数人愿意支持军事应对。然而，政治两极分化可能使妖魔化对手变得更容易，并培养一种道德优越感，从而可能助长政治暴力的群体动员。美国社会存在文化冲突（例如，传统价值观与进步价值观、移民、性别角色之间的冲突）。这些分歧可能被利用来制造政治目的的内部群体和外部群体。
虽然冲突初期公众支持可能很高，但美国深刻的政治和文化两极分化 可能使其难以在长期、代价高昂的“热战”中维持国家士气和公众支持。对手可能通过信息战利用这些内部矛盾，从内部削弱战争努力。因此，美国国内文化和政治格局的显著内部差异，对维持国家团结和公众支持构成风险，而这些是承受长期战争艰辛的关键。
中国
中国民族主义与被外国列强“羞辱和屈辱”的叙事深深交织，中国共产党声称已克服了这一时期，从而使其统治合法化。这种叙事可以成为动员公众支持对抗外部威胁的有力工具。“百年国耻”的叙事是中国政治环境的核心，并影响着其外交关系。它可以被用来团结民众并为强硬行动辩护。中国共产党对信息和媒体保持严格控制，塑造公众舆论并压制异议。这种控制体现在压制批评和阻止调查的努力中。
虽然中国共产党对信息的控制及其对民族主义的培育 可以在冲突初期确保强大的公众支持，但它也创造了一个回音室，其中替代观点受到压制。如果战争进展不顺利或造成严重困难，习惯于强大和成功叙事的公众可能会经历士气和信任的迅速下降，可能导致社会动荡。缺乏真正的自下而上的反馈机制可能会阻止领导层准确评估公众情绪并进行调整。因此，中国公众舆论的高度管理性质，虽然表面上提供了统一，但在面对意想不到的战时挫折或长期苦难时可能显得脆弱，可能导致合法性和社会稳定的迅速侵蚀。
B. 软实力与国际形象
美国
美国传统上利用其文化、价值观（开放、自由、个人主义）、教育交流和人道主义援助（美国国际开发署）来塑造偏好并获得国际支持。然而，近期政策，如“美国优先”方针和冻结对外援助，因侵蚀信任和传递不可靠信号而受到批评，可能削弱美国的影响力以及国际社会合作的意愿。一些评论员认为，尽管美国推行软实力倡议，但未能被公认为世界领导者。
美国软实力的下降，特别是通过减少对外援助和被视为不可靠，可能会削弱其在“热战”中争取国际支持和维持强大联盟的能力。如果没有软实力的说服力，美国可能更依赖硬实力和强制，这可能进一步疏远潜在伙伴并强化对抗性集团。因此，软实力影响力的减弱可能导致外交杠杆的降低，以及在重大冲突中国际联盟的凝聚力下降，使得美国更难孤立对手或为其行动赢得广泛的国际合法性。
中国
中国通过文化输出（电影、电视剧、游戏）、数字平台、语言推广、技术进步（人工智能、5G、绿色技术）和积极外交（“一带一路”、维和、人道主义援助）精心培育其软实力。中国拥有全球最大的外交网络。然而，中国的软实力努力面临人权、审查制度和知识产权保护等方面的持续挑战。一些人认为，中国的软实力是通过操纵而非真正的说服产生的。
虽然中国的“锐实力”（通过操纵和媒体控制施加影响力）和经济杠杆（“一带一路”）可以在和平时期扩大其全球影响力，但其缺乏透明度和人权记录 限制了其建立深厚、基于信任的联盟的能力，而这种联盟才能在“热战”中提供无条件支持。对操纵的感知可能导致反弹，如果冲突给其他国家带来巨大代价。因此，中国软实力虽然影响力日增，但在建立能够承受长期全球冲突牺牲的、有韧性且意识形态一致的联盟方面，可能不如传统民主国家的软实力有效。其影响力可能更具交易性，在严峻危机时期缺乏韧性。
VI. 工业水平 (Industrial Capabilities)
A. 总体制造能力
美国
2024年，美国约占全球制造业产出的15.9%。近几十年来，美国已转向服务型经济，2021年制造业仅占GDP的10.6%。这种转变导致其工业基础的衰退。美国国防工业基础（DIB）正面临严峻挑战，包括基础设施老化、技术过时、产能不足和供应链脆弱性。制造业熟练劳动力严重短缺，劳动力老龄化和培训不足的问题突出。国防工业基础很大程度上处于“和平时期状态”。
美国向服务业经济的转型及其国防工业基础的“和平时期状态” 意味着其当前的工业产出 并不能反映其潜在的战时动员能力。尽管美国历史上曾有大规模战时生产的壮举（例如二战期间生产30万架飞机、8.6万辆坦克），但当前的国防工业基础缺乏快速增产的响应能力和灵活性。劳动力老龄化和供应链依赖性 更加剧了这一问题。因此，尽管美国在技术上处于领先地位，但在迅速将其工业基础转变为满足大规模“热战”需求方面面临巨大挑战，这可能导致在长期冲突中出现关键弹药和设备短缺。
中国
中国是全球最大的制造业国家，约占全球制造业产出的31.6% 至35%。其生产能力超过了紧随其后的九个最大制造业国家的总和。中国工业部门持续强劲增长，得益于高科技制造和设备生产的进步。中国国防工业基础正处于“战时状态”，并以比美国快5到6倍的速度投资弹药和采购高端武器系统和设备。中国是全球最大的造船国，其造船能力约为美国的230倍。中国的一个大型造船厂，如江南造船厂，其产能超过了美国所有造船厂的总和。
中国庞大的制造业基础和军民融合战略 赋予其在战时迅速扩大军事生产的显著能力。这种生产优势使其能够快速补充消耗，并可能在数量上压倒对手。然而，中国在关键高科技领域（如半导体制造设备、航空发动机核心部件）仍存在对外国技术的依赖，这可能在冲突中成为其供应链的脆弱点，尤其是在面临技术封锁时。
B. 关键工业部门与技术实力
美国
美国在人工智能（AI）、连接技术和自主系统等军事技术方面处于领先地位。国防部已拨款用于开发安全的AI平台、劳动力培训和现代化，以确保美国军队在AI驱动的战争中保持领先。美国在半导体设计方面仍保持领先，但中国在某些领域正在迎头赶上。美国国防部严重依赖中国供应链中的关键矿产，例如稀土元素、镓、锗、锑、钨和碲，这些矿产对1900种武器系统中的80000多个部件至关重要。中国对这些矿产的出口限制可能直接影响美国国防工业的生产能力。
美国在半导体和先进电子产品方面仍保持技术优势，这些是现代防御系统的技术骨干。然而，其对中国关键矿产的依赖 是一个显著的战略脆弱点。如果中国在冲突中限制这些矿产的出口，将直接影响美国军事生产和维持能力，可能导致“空仓”问题。尽管美国正在努力实现国内生产和多元化采购，但短期内难以完全摆脱这种依赖。
中国
中国在半导体领域已取得显著进展，尤其是在成熟制程芯片生产方面，并计划到2030年占据全球产能的更大份额。尽管面临美国的出口管制，中国在先进芯片技术方面也取得了重大进展，例如华为的7纳米芯片组。中国在人工智能（AI）、量子计算、5G、先进核技术和航空航天技术等新兴国防技术领域迅速发展。然而，中国在航空发动机等关键高科技领域仍存在技术差距，例如WS-10发动机的可靠性问题和WS-15发动机的量产挑战，这使其在民用航空领域仍依赖西方技术。
美国对芯片的出口管制 旨在阻碍中国在人工智能和军事创新方面的进展。虽然这些措施在短期内取得了一定成功，但它们也刺激了中国对半导体自给自足的全面投入，并可能促使其开发出突破性技术。这种“倒逼效应”可能导致中国在某些领域实现技术飞跃，从而削弱美国的长期技术领先地位。然而，中国在高端半导体制造设备（如光刻机）方面仍存在显著弱点，这限制了其在最先进芯片生产方面的能力。
C. 国防工业基础准备与动员潜力
美国
美国国防工业基础（DIB）缺乏满足美军生产和作战需求的产能、响应能力、灵活性和激增能力。基础设施老化、技术过时、熟练劳动力短缺和供应链脆弱性是主要问题。国防部正在努力通过改革采购流程、优先使用商业解决方案和利用《国防生产法》等现有授权来加速国防采购和振兴国防工业基础。
美国国防工业基础在很大程度上处于“和平时期状态”，这与中国“战时状态”的国防工业形成鲜明对比。这意味着美国在面对大规模“热战”时，可能难以迅速将工业产能转化为军事生产，从而导致弹药和关键系统短缺。尽管美国有二战期间大规模动员的经验，但现代经济的全球互联性 和国内制造业的空心化 使得这种快速转型更具挑战性。
中国
中国正在将其国防动员体系（NDMS）从应急响应和经济补贴工具转变为以战争为导向的体系。自2015年以来，中国已启动一系列改革，以优先发展战争动员能力，包括国家发展和改革委员会（NDRC）对政府动员规划和军事支持的控制。中国还通过立法和结构性改革，增强了NDMS，使其能够将政治、经济、技术、文化、社会和其他民用资源从和平时期转化为战时使用，从而增强军事物流能力。
中国国防工业基础正处于“战时状态”，并在生产和获取先进武器系统方面超越美国。其庞大的制造业规模和军民融合战略 使其具备在战时迅速扩大生产的巨大潜力。然而，国家发展和改革委员会在调配资源以支持解放军大规模作战需求方面可能面临挑战，因为这与国家经济复苏和发展需求相互竞争。此外，尽管中国拥有强大的工业生产能力，但其在某些关键技术（如半导体制造设备）上仍依赖外部，这可能在冲突中成为其供应链的瓶颈。
VII. 战争潜力 (War Potential)
A. 人力资源与兵员
美国
美国总人口约为3.41亿，达到服役年龄的人口为444.5万。现役军人132.8万，预备役79.95万，总军事人员212.75万。
中国
中国总人口约为14.15亿，达到服役年龄的人口为1981万。现役军人203.5万，预备役51万，准军事部队62.5万，总军事人员317万。
B. 战略储备 (能源与粮食)
美国
美国拥有全球最大的战略石油储备（SPR），授权储存能力为7.14亿桶。SPR旨在减少石油供应中断的影响，并在外交政策中发挥关键作用。美国在二战期间通过增加石油产量、建立石油战时管理局以及建设输油管道等措施，确保了能源独立性。美国还致力于能源转型，目标是到2025年至少25%的国防部能源来自可再生能源。
在粮食安全方面，美国在二战期间通过政府机构管理粮食生产和分配，实施配给制，并鼓励平民种植“胜利菜园”以应对军事需求和劳动力短缺。美国拥有悠久的对抗全球饥饿的历史，并将人道主义援助视为国家安全的重要组成部分。
中国
中国没有正式公布其战略石油储备量，但据估计，2016年其储备量约为4亿桶，总容量约为5亿桶。有报道称，中国正在加速建立战略储备，以应对未来战争或国际制裁。中国能源结构主要依赖国内煤炭、国内外石油和天然气，并积极寻求多元化供应以减少对中东石油的依赖。
在粮食安全方面，中国将“确保粮食供应”和整体粮食安全作为首要任务，并计划到2025年实现农业自给自足。中国已建立全球最大的粮食储备系统。尽管面临耕地稀缺、水资源不足和环境污染等挑战，中国仍致力于通过先进农业技术和政策支持提高粮食产量。中国还恢复了毛泽东时代的粮食分配系统，这在战时可以提供紧急物流网络。
C. 物流与供应链能力
美国
美国国防后勤局（DLA）管理着九个关键供应链，并运营着全球存储和分销网络。然而，美国军事物流系统在战时可能面临挑战，例如弹药消耗可能超过现有库存，导致“空仓”问题。美军在海外的后勤和补给能力对维持其全球力量投射至关重要。
美国国防工业基础的供应链依赖全球，特别是关键原材料和零部件的依赖，构成重大风险，在冲突情境下可能被利用或中断。美国正在努力通过投资国内制造业和战略工业政策来加强供应链韧性，并与盟友和伙伴合作。然而，这种转型需要时间，且在短期内难以完全解决所有脆弱性。
中国
中国人民解放军（PLA）投射和维持作战能力的能力取决于其后勤能力、系统和流程。中国正在扩大其远程资产库存，如重型运输机和后勤舰船，以支持航母和其他水面作战舰艇的远程部署。中国在吉布提建立了首个海外基地，并正在寻求更多海外物流点以支持海军行动。
中美贸易战对全球供应链和物流业构成了重大挑战，导致运输量急剧下降，增加了复杂性和风险。中国企业正在重塑供应链战略，寻找替代地点并考虑“近岸”或“友岸”模式，以增强韧性和透明度。然而，缺乏明确的谈判前景导致长期不确定性，阻碍了物流基础设施和供应链优化的长期投资。在“热战”中，中国对海上交通线（SLOCs）的严重依赖是一个潜在的脆弱点，因为海军封锁可能迫使海上交通改道，增加运输成本和风险。
D. 网络与空间战能力
美国
网络战对联合部队构成重大威胁，需要进行准备以应对此类威胁。美国国防部正专注于支持空间系统任务所需的基础设施。美国在卫星主导地位方面处于领先地位，但中国正在通过量子技术和网络间谍活动缩小差距。美国正在开发“黄金穹顶”导弹防御系统，旨在通过天基拦截器和传感器网络来保护美国本土免受先进空中威胁。
网络攻击可以影响生产线，使其停产，从而影响现实世界的国防部任务。美国国防工业基础的网络韧性建设至关重要。此外，美国军方对空间架构的严重依赖使其成为解放军网络和太空攻击的诱人目标。中国正在积极发展反卫星武器，包括地基激光器和能够捕获其他卫星的卫星，这对美国构成了“严重威胁”。
中国
中国拥有活跃的网络攻击和防御能力。解放军战略支援部队（PLASSF）整合了网络情报、防御和攻击能力。中国正在迅速发展空间战能力，以摧毁美国卫星并在未来冲突中协助进行远程攻击。中国在天基能力方面的进步使其对天基能力的依赖性增加，因此也更加担心不负责任的动能测试。
中国将网络空间视为第五个作战领域，并积极利用网络工具进行间谍活动和预置破坏性行动。中国人民解放军认为，通过延长冲突时间并瞄准美国联盟网络，可以削弱美国的技术优势。解放军评估，美国国防工业基础无法支撑一场持久战，并且美国的军事技术优势将随着战争的持续而减弱。中国国防动员系统在这种冲突中具有优势。
E. 核威慑与核学说
美国
美国拥有核威慑能力，其核学说允许在某些情况下使用核武器，包括对自身或盟友领土的入侵或攻击。美国正在开发能够携带战略有效载荷（包括神经毒剂和核武器）的高超音速导弹，这些导弹能够以极快的速度和机动性打击目标。美国正在发展天基拦截器和分层防御能力，以应对高超音速、弹道和巡航导弹威胁。
中国
中国正式奉行“不首先使用核武器”政策，即除非受到核武器或其他大规模杀伤性武器的攻击，否则不首先使用核武器。然而，美国国防分析人士认为，中国正在从严格的“不首先使用”战略转向“预警即发射”（LOW）态势。中国正在建造320个新的洲际弹道导弹发射井，并开发新型洲际弹道导弹和先进战略运载系统。中国还扩大了其双能力DF-26中程弹道导弹部队，并正在改装其094型弹道导弹核潜艇以搭载射程更远的JL-3潜射弹道导弹。中国还重新分配了作战核任务给部分轰炸机，配备了可能具有核能力空射弹道导弹。五角大楼估计，到2025年，中国核弹头数量将达到600枚左右，到2030年将超过1000枚。中国核力量的扩张旨在提供更大的升级控制能力，并威慑美国干预。
F. 整体作战能力与适应性
美国
美国军方拥有无与伦比的全球覆盖和技术优势，是西方军事学说的支柱。美国在空中力量方面保持着无可匹敌的优势，其飞机总数（13043架）远超中国（3309架）。美国海军虽然在舰艇数量上被中国超越，但其拥有11艘航空母舰，而中国有2艘。美国在情报、监视、侦察（ISR）和指挥、控制、通信、计算机（C4）系统方面具有显著优势。
然而，美国国防工业基础的现状反映出政策制定者对“即时”供应链和最低成本合同的偏好，这使其在应对重大冲突时缺乏快速增产的能力。美国在关键矿产供应链上对中国的依赖是一个显著的脆弱点，可能影响其制造先进军事系统的能力。
中国
中国人民解放军（PLA）正在进行前所未有的军事现代化，发展庞大而先进的核、常规、网络和空间能力。解放军海军（PLAN）是世界上规模最大的海军，拥有超过370艘作战舰艇，预计到2025年将增至395艘。中国在陆军兵力、坦克和火炮数量上超过美国。中国在AI、高超音速和先进导弹以及天基能力等尖端技术方面发展迅速。
中国军事现代化由世界一流的国防工业基础支撑，使其在造船和生产各种海军作战舰艇方面几乎实现自给自足。然而，解放军缺乏近期实战经验，其维持高强度作战的维护能力未经实战检验。中国在航空发动机和先进半导体等关键高科技领域仍存在对外部的依赖。
VIII. 结论
在假想的“热战”情境下，中美两国都拥有独特的国家实力优势和显著的脆弱性，这将深刻影响冲突的进程和结果。
美国的优势在于其强大的盟友网络和全球影响力，这使其能够构建广泛的国际联盟，并在全球范围内投射力量。其金融市场的深度和美元的储备货币地位提供了巨大的融资能力，尽管日益增长的国债可能构成长期制约。美国在技术创新方面仍保持领先，尤其是在人工智能和先进军事技术领域。然而，美国面临的主要挑战在于其国内政治两极分化，这可能削弱国家团结和在长期冲突中维持公众支持的能力。此外，其制造业基础的空心化和对全球供应链的依赖，使其在战时易受供应中断的影响。
中国的优势在于其庞大的工业生产能力，作为全球制造业中心，能够迅速大规模生产军事和民用物资。其高度集中的政治体制能够实现快速决策和资源动员。中国在稀土等关键矿产资源上占据主导地位，并积极发展能源和粮食战略储备，以增强自给自足能力。此外，中国在网络和空间战能力方面迅速发展，并拥有世界领先的高超音速导弹库。然而，中国的脆弱性在于其经济结构对出口的依赖，这使其在面对制裁和封锁时容易受到经济冲击，可能引发内部社会动荡。其金融体系虽然受到国家控制，但面临房地产危机和地方债务等深层结构性问题。此外，其在某些高端技术（如先进半导体制造设备和航空发动机）上对外部的依赖，以及信息控制可能带来的内部反馈机制不足，都可能限制其在长期、复杂冲突中的适应性和韧性。
总而言之，一场中美“热战”将是代价极其高昂的，并可能导致双方都付出巨大的经济、社会和人员代价。冲突的持续时间可能超出传统预期，并伴随着升级为核战争的风险。双方都将试图利用对方的弱点，例如美国可能通过经济制裁和供应链中断来打击中国的出口导向型经济和技术依赖，而中国可能通过限制关键矿产出口和利用网络/空间战能力来削弱美国的工业和军事生产。最终，冲突的走向将取决于双方能否有效利用其核心优势，同时最大程度地减轻其固有的脆弱性。
Analysis Report on National Power Comparison Between the US and China in a Hypothetical “Hot War” Scenario
I. Executive Summary
This report aims to deeply analyze the national power comparison between the United States and China, excluding weapon systems, in a hypothetical “hot war” scenario. The analysis covers multiple dimensions, including politics, economy, culture, industrial capacity, and war potential, with the goal of providing a comprehensive and objective assessment for senior strategic decision-makers and researchers.
The analysis reveals that while the U.S. political system faces challenges of polarization, its inherent democratic resilience and extensive network of allies still constitute significant advantages, although “America First” policies may raise allies’ doubts about its long-term commitment. China, with its highly centralized political system, demonstrates the ability to make rapid decisions and mobilize resources in the early stages of a crisis, but the lack of bottom-up feedback mechanisms may limit its adaptability in a prolonged conflict.
Economically, the U.S. consumer-driven economy, dominated by the service sector, may face inflation and livelihood pressures if global supply chains are disrupted. China’s vast industrial production capacity is the cornerstone of its war potential, but its export-oriented economic model and real estate and local government debt issues could lead to internal instability in the face of economic warfare.
Culturally, internal cultural divisions in the U.S. could be exploited by adversaries to undermine domestic cohesion, and a weakening of its soft power might affect international support. China, on the other hand, can rally public support through nationalist narratives, but over-reliance on information control could lead to a rapid reversal of public opinion if the war goes unfavorably, impacting social stability.
In terms of industrial capacity, China, as the global manufacturing hub, possesses significant production advantages and a military-civil fusion strategy, enabling it to rapidly expand military production. However, its reliance on external sources for high-end technologies remains a potential weakness. While the U.S. has seen manufacturing offshoring, its innovation capabilities and the potential for its defense industrial base to adapt should not be underestimated, despite challenges in capacity and skilled labor.
Regarding war potential, both countries possess vast human resources. The U.S. has advantages in energy and food reserves, but supply chain resilience faces challenges. China dominates in critical minerals like rare earths and is actively building energy and food security systems. Cyber and space domains have become new battlegrounds, with both nations actively developing related capabilities that could profoundly impact military operations and critical infrastructure.
Overall, both countries possess unique strengths and significant weaknesses in a potential conflict. The U.S. advantages lie in its alliance system, financial resilience, and technological innovation leadership, but its domestic political divisions and industrial hollowing-out are challenges. China’s strengths are its immense industrial production capacity, unified political will, and control over critical resources, but its structural economic problems, reliance on external markets, and potential drawbacks of information control are its disadvantages. A “hot war” would be costly and could have profound implications for the global order.
II. Introduction
A. Purpose and Scope
This report aims to provide a foundational assessment of the national power of the United States and China, beyond direct weapon systems comparisons, in a hypothetical “hot war” scenario. The analysis will focus on the deeper dimensions that underpin national strength, including political stability, economic resilience, cultural cohesion, industrial production capabilities, and overall war potential. The objective of this report is to offer a comprehensive, objective, and authoritative perspective for senior strategic decision-makers and researchers, with a view to informing strategic planning.
B. Context of US-China Relations
As the world’s largest developed and developing nations, respectively, the relationship between the United States and China is experiencing increasingly intense strategic competition, manifested across economic, technological, and geopolitical domains. This competition has escalated into trade disputes, attempts at technological decoupling, and increased military activities in critical areas such as the Taiwan Strait. Understanding the non-military foundations of national power is crucial when assessing the long-term sustainability and outcomes of any potential large-scale conflict.
III. Political Landscape
A. Governance and Decision-Making
United States
The United States operates under a democratic system, with inherent checks and balances designed to prevent excessive concentration of power. However, this system is currently facing significant challenges from political polarization. This polarization has led to sharp, antagonistic divisions between opposing political parties, hindering effective governance and fostering distrust. Public discourse has become increasingly confrontational, with compromise often viewed as a sign of weakness.
In a crisis, democracies often appear slow to make decisions due to the need for deliberation and consensus. However, some academic perspectives argue that democratic systems possess unique resources for responding to emergencies and crises through their institutional flexibility, accountability, and information flow. Yet, the current high degree of polarization in the U.S. could impede swift and unified action during a crisis. This political polarization may lead to an “us vs. them” mentality, making it easier to demonize opponents. While public support for military deployment in domestic unrest has surprisingly shown no significant partisan bias, deeper societal divisions could undermine the national unity required for a prolonged external conflict. The U.S. military itself tends to resist domestic deployment, indicating a professional norm that might conflict with political pressures during a crisis. Therefore, a highly polarized domestic environment could lead to fragmentation of public consensus on war aims and sustainment, weakening the political will needed for a prolonged conflict, even if initial military actions garner broad support. This internal friction might be a more significant vulnerability than external threats.
China
China operates under a highly centralized, one-party authoritarian system, with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) maintaining tight control. Chinese strategists believe they can effectively control all aspects of military escalation and manage crises through a highly procedural and scientific approach. This over-reliance on theoretical underpinnings could make them overconfident in their ability to prevail in a conflict, increasing the risk of escalation in a military confrontation between China and the United States.
While the system offers advantages in career incentives and long-term decision-making, it lacks bottom-up accountability and institutionalized oversight, making it difficult to quickly detect and correct errors or abuses of power. This could lead to overreactions in a crisis and result in weaker systemic resilience compared to more open systems. China’s highly centralized system may enable rapid decision-making and resource mobilization in the initial stages of a conflict. However, the lack of robust internal feedback mechanisms and suppression of dissent could hinder adaptive learning and course correction in a prolonged, unpredictable conflict. The tendency for “overreaction” in a crisis might lead to miscalculations or an inability to adjust strategies in the face of unforeseen challenges, potentially prolonging the conflict or escalating its costs. Thus, despite its apparent decisiveness, the rigidity of China’s system and the potential for information distortion could be critical weaknesses in a dynamic, high-stakes “hot war,” where continuous adaptation and accurate information flow are paramount.
B. International Alliances and Diplomatic Influence
United States
The United States possesses an extensive network of diplomatic relations and formal treaties, including NATO, the Organization of American States, NORAD (with Canada), and ANZUS (with Australia and New Zealand). These alliances are considered crucial for deterring war and winning conflicts. U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific are the cornerstone of its strategy to maintain regional stability and deter aggression, providing access, interoperability, and shared capabilities that amplify American power. The U.S. maintains over 800 military bases globally.
However, concerns exist regarding the U.S.’s commitment to multilateralism, which is seen as ambivalent and selective, often adopting an “exceptionalist” stance in international treaties. The “America First” approach pursued by some administrations can leave allies feeling “blindsided,” raising questions about U.S. reliability and potentially creating opportunities for adversaries to fill power vacuums. For instance, recent actions like freezing foreign aid are eroding trust and partnerships. While the U.S. benefits significantly from its extensive alliances, its historical tendency to “vacillate between isolationism and full engagement” combined with recent “America First” policies, could lead to uncertainty among allies regarding sustained support in a prolonged “hot war.” Allies might hesitate to fully commit if they perceive the U.S. as unreliable or the conflict’s costs as too high, potentially leading to a fragmentation of the allied front. Therefore, the strength of U.S. alliances depends not only on military interoperability but also on the perception of long-term political commitment and shared responsibility, especially when conflict imposes severe economic or social costs on allies.
China
China is strengthening its relationships with countries like Russia, Iran, and North Korea, which, while not as institutionalized as NATO, have demonstrated strong mutual support for military efforts. China has also established “comprehensive strategic partnerships” with nations such as Nigeria, including military support and training. China actively enhances its international influence through extensive diplomatic engagement and global initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), particularly by leveraging discontent with the U.S.-led world order. The BRI has provided infrastructure development and economic opportunities to numerous countries, especially in the developing world, enhancing China’s image as a responsible global actor.
China meticulously cultivates its soft power through cultural exports (films, TV series, games), digital platforms, language promotion, technological advancements (AI, 5G, green technologies), and active diplomacy (BRI, peacekeeping, humanitarian aid). China possesses the world’s largest diplomatic network. However, these efforts face criticism regarding data privacy, censorship, human rights, and intellectual property protection, which pose ongoing challenges to its global image. Some commentators argue that China’s soft power is based on manipulation rather than genuine persuasion. China’s approach to the international order aims to reduce its vulnerability to U.S. power and increase its freedom of action, emphasizing Westphalian principles like sovereignty and non-interference. It has taken measures such as restricting exports of critical minerals in response to U.S. tariffs and export controls.
While China’s growing strategic partnerships and economic leverage (BRI) have expanded its global influence in peacetime, these relationships are often transactional and lack the deep ideological alignment or mutual defense obligations characteristic of traditional alliances like NATO. In a “hot war,” the reliability of such partnerships, especially when facing severe economic pressure or direct military threats, remains questionable. Countries might align with China for economic benefits but may not offer unconditional military support. Therefore, China’s diplomatic influence, though expanding, might be less effective in securing broad, unconditional military support in a direct “hot war” with the U.S. and its allies than it is in peacetime competition or gray-zone conflicts. The “manipulative” aspects of its soft power suggest that its foundation for building international solidarity might not be robust enough in a true international crisis.
C. Domestic Stability and Cohesion
United States
Political polarization has created deep fissures in the social and political fabric of the United States, with a significant portion of partisans viewing the opposing party as a threat to the nation’s well-being. This “us vs. them” mentality makes compromise difficult and could hinder national unity in a major conflict. The unit cohesion of the U.S. military—the bonds among soldiers that sustain their will and commitment under pressure—has been a point of contention, particularly concerning racial and gender integration. Social attraction, group prestige, and task commitment are key factors in cohesion.
Cultural conflicts within American society (e.g., between traditional and progressive values, over immigration, and gender roles) could be exploited to create internal and external groups for political purposes. China actively seeks to influence U.S. public opinion and culture, aiming to sow doubt and create division, including by supporting certain films to create rifts between U.S.-Japan allies. In a “hot war,” these pre-existing domestic cultural and political divisions could be exploited by adversaries to undermine public support for the war effort and weaken national resolve. Therefore, the significant internal disparities in the U.S. domestic cultural and political landscape pose a risk to maintaining national unity and public support, which are crucial for enduring the hardships of a prolonged war.
China
Maintaining social stability is a top priority for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), especially given the demographic trends (aging workforce, low birth rates) that pressure economic productivity and social stability. The Chinese economy faces challenges such as a real estate crisis, declining consumer demand, and high local government debt. Reports indicate factory closures, mass layoffs, and worker protests over wage issues are occurring. Additionally, there are reports of open protests against the government and discontent with the leadership. A prolonged economic downturn could lead to stagnation and test the CCP’s ability to maintain control.
Chinese nationalism is deeply rooted in a historical narrative of “shame and humiliation” at the hands of foreign powers, which the CCP claims to have overcome, thereby legitimizing its rule and territorial claims. This narrative is a powerful tool for mobilizing public support against external threats. The “century of humiliation” narrative is central to China’s political milieu and influences its foreign relations. It can be used to unite the populace and justify assertive actions. The CCP maintains strict control over information and media, shaping public opinion and suppressing dissent. This control is evident in efforts to suppress criticism and block investigations.
While nationalism can be a strong unifying force for China, especially in the face of external threats, prolonged economic difficulties and growing social discontent could erode the CCP’s legitimacy, which is partly tied to economic performance. In a “hot war,” economic disruptions (sanctions, blockades) would exacerbate these issues, potentially leading to widespread social unrest and challenging the CCP’s control. Therefore, China’s internal stability, though seemingly robust due to centralized control, might prove surprisingly vulnerable to the economic consequences of a major conflict, potentially leading to internal challenges that divert resources and attention from the war effort.
IV. Economic Foundations
A. Economic Size and Structure
United States
In 2024, the U.S. economy is approximately $29.2 trillion, with an annual growth rate of 2.8%. The U.S. has a diverse, highly developed, and private-sector-led economy, characterized by high productivity, technological innovation, and competitiveness. The service sector accounts for a large portion of GDP (76.7% in 2021) and employment, with private consumption making up 68.0% of GDP in 2022. The U.S. economy is primarily consumption-driven.
A consumption-driven economy heavily relies on the availability of goods, many of which are imported. In a “hot war,” disruptions to global supply chains would directly impact consumer goods prices and availability, potentially leading to inflation and decreased consumer confidence. This could create domestic economic instability, as demonstrated by the effects of tariffs. Therefore, while a strong consumption base is an advantage in peacetime, it could become a wartime vulnerability if supply chains are severed and domestic production cannot quickly compensate for lost imports, leading to public discontent.
China
In 2025, China’s economy, measured by purchasing power parity (PPP), is projected to surpass the U.S., reaching approximately $35.29 trillion. China’s economic development has largely been fueled by its vast industrial sector, with value-added industrial output accounting for nearly 40% of GDP in 2023, more than double that of the United States. China is the world’s largest industrial producer. China is reaching the limits of its investment-driven growth model, with household consumption significantly lagging (39% of GDP in 2023, compared to 68% in the U.S.). Despite government efforts, consumption remains weak due to real estate vulnerabilities, debt, and deflationary risks.
China’s immense industrial production capacity is a clear advantage for wartime production and mobilization. However, its historical reliance on exports and investment-driven growth means that significant disruptions to international trade (e.g., blockades, sanctions) could lead to overcapacity, factory closures, and rising unemployment. This would exacerbate existing domestic consumption weakness and debt problems. Therefore, while China’s industrial strength provides a solid foundation for military production, its economic structure’s reliance on external markets and investment could make it vulnerable to economic warfare, leading to internal economic instability and social unrest.
Table: US-China GDP Comparison (2024-2025)
| Indicator | United States (2024/2025) | China (2024/2025) |
| Nominal GDP (trillions USD) | 29.2 (2024) | 18.685 (2024) |
| PPP GDP (trillions USD) | 25.051 (2024), 25.727 (2025 proj.) | 32.830 (2024), 34.340 (2025 proj.) |
| Annual GDP Growth Rate (%) | 2.8 (2024) | 5.0 (2024) |
| Primary Industry as % of GDP | 0.9 (2021) | 6.8 (2024) |
| Secondary Industry as % of GDP | 18 (2023) | 36.5 (2024) |
| Tertiary Industry as % of GDP | 77 (2023) | 56.7 (2024) |
B. Trade and Global Supply Chain Impact
United States
For decades, the industrial base of the U.S. economy has hollowed out, becoming reliant on complex global supply chains. Many U.S. small and medium-sized enterprises depend on China’s low-cost, rapid manufacturing capabilities and logistics systems. Tariffs imposed on Chinese goods have increased costs for American consumers and businesses. This can lead to reduced demand for U.S.-made goods and trigger inflation. Companies have had to shift manufacturing bases, which requires time and investment costs, and faces unstable impacts on quality and efficiency.
The U.S. is using tariffs and subsidies to encourage companies to shift production domestically or to allies, aiming to build a resilient economic base. The focus is on strengthening critical supply chains through domestic manufacturing and strategic industrial policies, including energy, agriculture, medical products, and defense. The U.S.’s reliance on global supply chains, particularly for critical components, means that any disruption (e.g., blockades or cyberattacks on logistics) could severely impact its ability to sustain military operations and maintain domestic stability. The explicit goal of “rebuilding sufficient domestic capability to sustain critical sectors” indicates an acknowledgment of current vulnerabilities. Therefore, while the U.S. is working towards reshoring and diversification, its existing deep integration with global supply chains, especially with China, poses a significant strategic vulnerability for the U.S. in a “hot war” scenario, potentially affecting both military readiness and civilian livelihoods.
China
The Chinese economy is fundamentally dependent on exports. In 2024, China’s exports to the U.S. exceeded $500 billion, accounting for 16.4% of its total exports. China is actively diversifying its export channels and promoting digital and green trade to enhance its resilience against external shocks. It has also accelerated the relocation of manufacturing overseas to countries like Vietnam and Mexico to circumvent tariffs. China’s comprehensive domestic manufacturing system and industrial clusters offer unique advantages.
U.S. tariffs have led to a reduction in China’s exports to the U.S., affecting relevant industries (e.g., textiles, electronics, automobiles) and causing unemployment. In retaliation, China has also imposed its own tariffs and restricted exports of critical minerals. The economies of the U.S. and China are deeply intertwined, and a complete decoupling would be extremely costly. China’s control over critical minerals and its central role in global manufacturing allow it to “weaponize” its supply chain dominance. For example, restricting rare earth exports directly threatens U.S. high-tech and military supply chains. This creates a “circuitous reliance,” where U.S. efforts to de-Sinicize supply chains may still depend on Chinese intermediate products. Therefore, a “hot war” would transform economic interdependence from a stabilizing factor into a major area of conflict, with both sides leveraging their supply chain choke points to inflict maximum economic damage and disrupt each other’s industrial and military production.
C. Financial Resilience and National Debt
United States
The U.S. Treasury market, while generally resilient, experienced “severe dysfunction” during crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020. Concerns exist that dealer balance sheets are not sufficiently large and flexible to effectively intermediate this market during a “dash for cash.” U.S. national debt reached $36.22 trillion in May 2025 (124% of GDP), a new high since World War II. Interest payments on the national debt are projected to exceed defense spending. High debt levels reduce fiscal flexibility in responding to threats or economic downturns.
The escalating national debt and its servicing costs constitute a significant strategic constraint. In a “hot war,” massive military expenditures would further inflate deficits, potentially leading to a fiscal crisis, eroding confidence in U.S. Treasury bonds, and jeopardizing the dollar’s reserve currency status. This would limit the U.S.’s ability to finance a prolonged war and respond to unforeseen economic shocks. Therefore, despite its robust financial strength, the U.S.’s growing debt burden could undermine its capacity for sustained economic mobilization and global leadership in a prolonged conflict.
China
China’s financial markets face severe challenges from external shocks (e.g., trade friction, COVID-19 pandemic) and internal issues (e.g., 2015 stock market crash). However, China’s financial markets are relatively small as a share of GDP (60% compared to 140% for the U.S.) and capital controls are in place, which may offer some protection against capital flight. The Chinese economy is grappling with a real estate crisis, declining consumer demand, and high local government debt. The official fiscal deficit is around 3% of GDP, but broader figures including off-balance sheet funds suggest it could reach 8.5-9% of GDP in 2025, and potentially higher in 2026.
The Chinese government can compel banks to undertake more lending, but this severely limits their ability to lend to growth-promoting sectors and impacts their capital adequacy. The central bank has announced measures to stabilize financial markets and inject liquidity. While state control over financial markets and capital controls may offer some protection against external shocks, underlying issues like the real estate crisis and local government debt pose significant systemic risks. In a “hot war,” massive wartime financing needs could exacerbate these vulnerabilities, potentially leading to credit crunch and asset price declines if the state’s capacity to absorb losses is overwhelmed. Therefore, China’s financial system, despite state control, faces deep structural issues that could be severely tested in a prolonged conflict, potentially leading to financial crises that undermine its ability to finance the war and maintain social stability.
V. Cultural Dynamics
A. National Morale and Public Support for Conflict
United States
Public attitudes towards military deployment in domestic unrest have been surprisingly resilient and nonpartisan, with most willing to support a military response. However, political polarization can make it easier to demonize opponents and foster a sense of moral superiority, potentially fueling group mobilization for political violence. Cultural conflicts exist within American society (e.g., between traditional and progressive values, over immigration, and gender roles). These divisions can be exploited to create in-groups and out-groups for political purposes.
While initial public support for a conflict might be high, the deep political and cultural polarization in the U.S. could make it difficult to sustain national morale and public support in a prolonged, costly “hot war.” Adversaries might exploit these internal divisions through information warfare to undermine the war effort from within. Therefore, the significant internal disparities in the U.S. domestic cultural and political landscape pose a risk to maintaining national unity and public support, which are crucial for enduring the hardships of a prolonged war.
China
Chinese nationalism is deeply intertwined with a narrative of “shame and humiliation” at the hands of foreign powers, which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) claims to have overcome, thereby legitimizing its rule. This narrative can be a powerful tool for mobilizing public support against external threats. The “century of humiliation” narrative is central to China’s political milieu and influences its foreign relations. It can be used to unite the populace and justify assertive actions. The CCP maintains strict control over information and media, shaping public opinion and suppressing dissent. This control is evident in efforts to suppress criticism and block investigations.
While the CCP’s control over information and its cultivation of nationalism can ensure strong public support in the initial stages of a conflict, it also creates an echo chamber where alternative views are suppressed. If the war does not progress favorably or causes severe hardship, a public accustomed to narratives of strength and success might experience a rapid decline in morale and trust, potentially leading to social unrest. The lack of genuine bottom-up feedback mechanisms might prevent the leadership from accurately assessing public sentiment and making adjustments. Therefore, the highly managed nature of Chinese public opinion, while seemingly providing unity, might prove fragile in the face of unexpected wartime setbacks or prolonged suffering, potentially leading to a rapid erosion of legitimacy and social stability.
B. Soft Power and International Image
United States
The U.S. has traditionally leveraged its culture, values (openness, freedom, individualism), educational exchanges, and humanitarian aid (USAID) to shape preferences and garner international support. However, recent policies, such as the “America First” approach and freezes on foreign aid, have been criticized for eroding trust and signaling unreliability, potentially weakening U.S. influence and the international community’s willingness to cooperate. Some commentators argue that despite U.S. soft power initiatives, it has failed to be recognized as a world leader.
The decline of U.S. soft power, particularly through reduced foreign aid and being perceived as unreliable, could weaken its ability to garner international support and maintain strong alliances in a “hot war.” Without the persuasive power of soft power, the U.S. might rely more on hard power and coercion, which could further alienate potential partners and reinforce adversarial blocs. Therefore, a diminished soft power influence could lead to reduced diplomatic leverage and less cohesive international alliances in a major conflict, making it harder for the U.S. to isolate adversaries or gain broad international legitimacy for its actions.
China
China meticulously cultivates its soft power through cultural exports (films, TV series, games), digital platforms, language promotion, technological advancements (AI, 5G, green technologies), and active diplomacy (Belt and Road Initiative, peacekeeping, humanitarian aid). China possesses the world’s largest diplomatic network. However, China’s soft power efforts face ongoing challenges regarding human rights, censorship, and intellectual property protection. Some argue that China’s soft power is generated through manipulation rather than genuine persuasion.
While China’s “sharp power” (influence through manipulation and media control) and economic leverage (Belt and Road Initiative) can expand its global influence in peacetime, its lack of transparency and human rights record limit its ability to build deep, trust-based alliances that would provide unconditional support in a “hot war.” The perception of manipulation could lead to backlash if the conflict imposes significant costs on other nations. Therefore, while China’s soft power is growing in influence, it may be less effective than that of traditional democracies in building resilient and ideologically aligned alliances capable of enduring the sacrifices of a prolonged global conflict. Its influence might be more transactional, lacking resilience in severe crises.
VI. Industrial Capabilities
A. Overall Manufacturing Capacity
United States
In 2024, the U.S. accounts for approximately 15.9% of global manufacturing output. In recent decades, the U.S. has shifted towards a service-based economy, with manufacturing accounting for only 10.6% of GDP in 2021. This shift has led to a decline in its industrial base. The U.S. Defense Industrial Base (DIB) faces severe challenges, including aging infrastructure, outdated technology, insufficient capacity, and supply chain vulnerabilities. There is a significant shortage of skilled manufacturing labor, with an aging workforce and inadequate training. The DIB largely operates in a “peacetime footing.”
The U.S. transition to a service economy and the “peacetime footing” of its Defense Industrial Base mean that its current industrial output does not reflect its potential wartime mobilization capacity. While the U.S. historically achieved massive wartime production (e.g., 300,000 aircraft and 86,000 tanks during WWII), the current DIB lacks the responsiveness and flexibility for rapid surge production. An aging workforce and supply chain dependencies further exacerbate this issue. Therefore, despite its technological leadership, the U.S. faces significant challenges in rapidly converting its industrial base to meet the demands of a large-scale “hot war,” potentially leading to shortages of critical munitions and equipment in a prolonged conflict.
China
China is the world’s largest manufacturing nation, accounting for approximately 31.6% to 35% of global manufacturing output. Its production capacity exceeds that of the next nine largest manufacturing nations combined. China’s industrial sector continues to grow robustly, driven by advancements in high-tech manufacturing and equipment production. China’s Defense Industrial Base operates on a “wartime footing” and invests in munitions and acquires high-end weapon systems and equipment five to six times faster than the United States. China is the world’s largest shipbuilder, with a shipbuilding capacity roughly 230 times larger than that of the U.S. One large Chinese shipyard, such as Jiangnan Shipyard, has more capacity than all U.S. shipyards combined.
China’s vast manufacturing base and military-civil fusion strategy grant it a significant capability to rapidly expand military production in wartime. This production advantage allows it to quickly replenish消耗 and potentially overwhelm adversaries in terms of quantity. However, China still relies on foreign technology in critical high-tech areas (e.g., semiconductor manufacturing equipment, core components for aero-engines), which could become vulnerabilities in its supply chain during a conflict, especially if facing technological blockades.
B. Key Industrial Sectors and Technological Prowess
United States
The U.S. leads in military technologies such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), connectivity, and autonomous systems. The Department of Defense has allocated funds for developing secure AI platforms, workforce training, and modernization to ensure the U.S. military remains at the forefront of AI-driven warfare. The U.S. maintains a lead in semiconductor design, though China is catching up in some areas. The U.S. Department of Defense heavily relies on Chinese supply chains for critical minerals, such as rare earth elements, gallium, germanium, antimony, tungsten, and tellurium, which are essential for over 80,000 distinct parts across 1,900 weapon systems. China’s export restrictions on these minerals could directly impact the U.S. defense industry’s production capacity.
The U.S. maintains a technological edge in semiconductors and advanced electronics, which are the technological backbone of modern defense systems. However, its reliance on critical minerals from China is a significant strategic vulnerability. If China restricts exports of these minerals during a conflict, it would directly impact U.S. military production and sustainment capabilities, potentially leading to “empty bins” issues. While the U.S. is working to onshore production and diversify sourcing, fully eliminating this dependency in the short term remains challenging.
China
China has made significant strides in semiconductors, particularly in mature-node chip production, and plans to capture a larger share of global capacity by 2030. Despite U.S. export controls, China has also made notable progress in advanced chip technology, such as Huawei’s 7-nanometer chipset. China is rapidly developing in emerging defense technologies like Artificial Intelligence (AI), quantum computing, 5G, advanced nuclear technology, and aerospace technology. However, China still has technological gaps in critical high-tech areas such as aero-engines, exemplified by reliability issues with the WS-10 engine and mass production challenges for the WS-15, which keeps it reliant on Western technology for civilian aviation.
U.S. export controls on chips aim to hinder China’s progress in AI and military innovation. While these measures have seen some short-term success, they have also spurred China’s all-out commitment to semiconductor self-sufficiency and could lead to the development of breakthrough technologies. This “forcing effect” might result in China achieving technological leaps in certain areas, thereby eroding the U.S.’s long-term technological lead. However, China still has significant weaknesses in high-end semiconductor manufacturing equipment (e.g., lithography machines), which limits its capabilities in producing the most advanced chips.
C. Defense Industrial Base Readiness and Mobilization Potential
United States
The U.S. Defense Industrial Base (DIB) lacks the capacity, responsiveness, flexibility, and surge capability to meet the U.S. military’s production and warfighting needs. Aging infrastructure, outdated technology, skilled labor shortages, and supply chain vulnerabilities are major issues. The Department of Defense is working to accelerate defense procurement and revitalize the DIB through reforms in acquisition processes, prioritizing commercial solutions, and leveraging existing authorities like the Defense Production Act.
The U.S. Defense Industrial Base largely operates on a “peacetime footing,” in stark contrast to China’s “wartime footing” DIB. This means the U.S. might struggle to rapidly convert industrial capacity to military production in a large-scale “hot war,” leading to shortages of munitions and critical systems. While the U.S. has historical experience with massive mobilization during WWII, the global interconnectedness of the modern economy and the hollowing out of domestic manufacturing make such rapid transformation more challenging.
China
China is transitioning its National Defense Mobilization System (NDMS) from an emergency response and economic subsidization tool to a war-oriented system. Since 2015, China has initiated a series of reforms to prioritize war mobilization capabilities, including the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) assuming control over government mobilization planning and military support. China has also enhanced the NDMS through legislation and structural reforms, enabling it to convert political, economic, technological, cultural, social, and other civilian resources from peacetime to wartime use, thereby strengthening military logistics.
China’s Defense Industrial Base operates on a “wartime footing” and is outpacing the U.S. in producing and acquiring advanced weapon systems. Its vast manufacturing scale and military-civil fusion strategy give it immense potential for rapid wartime production. However, the NDRC leadership may face challenges in posturing China’s resources to support PLA requirements for large-scale combat operations, given competing demands for national economic recovery and development. Furthermore, despite its strong industrial capacity, China still relies on external sources for certain critical technologies (e.g., semiconductor manufacturing equipment), which could become a bottleneck in its supply chain during a conflict.
VII. War Potential
A. Human Resources and Personnel
United States
The total population of the United States is approximately 341.96 million, with 4.445 million people reaching military age. It has 1.328 million active military personnel and 799,500 reservists, totaling 2.127 million military personnel.
China
China’s total population is approximately 1.415 billion, with 19.81 million people reaching military age. It has 2.035 million active military personnel, 510,000 reservists, and 625,000 paramilitary forces, totaling 3.17 million military personnel.
B. Strategic Reserves (Energy and Food)
United States
The U.S. maintains the world’s largest Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), with an authorized storage capacity of 714 million barrels. The SPR is designed to mitigate the impact of oil supply disruptions and plays a key role in foreign policy. During World War II, the U.S. ensured energy independence by increasing oil production, establishing the Petroleum Administration for War, and building pipelines. The U.S. is also committed to energy transition, aiming for at least 25% of the Department of Defense’s energy to come from renewable sources by 2025.
In terms of food security, during World War II, the U.S. managed food production and distribution through government agencies, implemented rationing, and encouraged civilians to grow “Victory Gardens” to meet military needs and address labor shortages. The U.S. has a long history of combating global hunger and views humanitarian assistance as a vital component of national security.
China
China does not officially disclose its strategic petroleum reserve volume, but estimates from 2016 suggested it held approximately 400 million barrels out of a total capacity of around 500 million barrels. Reports indicate China is accelerating the build-up of strategic reserves to prepare for future wars or international sanctions. China’s energy mix primarily relies on domestic coal, and domestic and foreign oil and gas, and it actively seeks to diversify supplies to reduce reliance on Middle Eastern oil.
Regarding food security, China prioritizes “ensuring grain supply” and overall food security, with plans to achieve agricultural self-sufficiency by 2025. China has established the world’s largest food reserve system. Despite challenges like scarce arable land, water insufficiency, and environmental pollution, China is committed to increasing food production through advanced agricultural technologies and policy support. China has also revived a Mao-era food distribution system, which could provide an emergency logistics network in wartime.
C. Logistics and Supply Chain Capabilities
United States
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) manages nine critical supply chains and operates a global storage and distribution network. However, the U.S. military logistics system may face challenges in wartime, such as munitions consumption exceeding existing stockpiles, leading to “empty bins” issues. U.S. overseas logistics and resupply capabilities are crucial for sustaining its global power projection.
The U.S. defense industrial base’s supply chain reliance on global sources, particularly for critical raw materials and components, poses significant risks that could be exploited or disrupted in a conflict. The U.S. is working to strengthen supply chain resilience through investments in domestic manufacturing and strategic industrial policies, and by collaborating with allies and partners. However, this transformation takes time and cannot fully address all vulnerabilities in the short term.
China
The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) ability to project and sustain combat power depends on its logistics capabilities, systems, and processes. China is expanding its inventory of long-range assets, such as heavy transport aircraft and logistics ships, to support long-range deployments of aircraft carriers and other surface combatants. China has established its first overseas base in Djibouti and is seeking more overseas logistics points to support naval operations.
The U.S.-China trade war has posed significant challenges to global supply chains and the logistics industry, leading to sharp declines in shipping volumes, increased complexity, and risks. Chinese companies are reshaping their supply chain strategies, seeking alternative locations and considering “near-shoring” or “friend-shoring” models to enhance resilience and transparency. However, the lack of clear negotiation prospects leads to long-term uncertainty, hindering long-term investments in logistics infrastructure and supply chain optimization. In a “hot war,” China’s heavy reliance on Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) is a potential vulnerability, as naval blockades could force diversions, increasing transportation costs and risks.
D. Cyber and Space Warfare Capabilities
United States
Cyber warfare poses a significant threat to the joint force, requiring preparation to counter such threats. The U.S. Department of Defense focuses on infrastructure supporting space systems missions. The U.S. leads in satellite dominance, but China is gaining ground through quantum technology and cyber espionage. The U.S. is developing the “Golden Dome for America” missile defense system, a multi-layered, space-integrated system designed to protect the U.S. homeland from advanced aerial threats.
Cyberattacks can impact production lines, shutting them down and affecting real-world DoD missions. Building cyber resilience in the U.S. defense industrial base is crucial. Furthermore, the U.S. military’s heavy reliance on its space architecture makes it an attractive target for the PLA, further reducing the effectiveness of space deterrence. China is actively developing anti-satellite weapons, including ground-based lasers and co-orbital satellites capable of “dogfighting” or physically removing other satellites from orbit, posing a “grave threat” to the U.S.
China
China possesses active cyberattack and defense capabilities. The PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) integrates cyber intelligence, defense, and attack capabilities. China is rapidly developing space warfare capabilities to destroy U.S. satellites in a future conflict and assist in conducting long-range attacks. China’s advancements in space-based capabilities have increased its reliance on them, leading to greater concern about irresponsible kinetic testing.
China views cyberspace as the fifth domain of warfare and actively uses cyber tools for espionage and to preposition for disruptive operations. The PLA believes that by prolonging a conflict and targeting U.S. alliance networks, it can blunt U.S. technological advantages. PLA researchers assess that the U.S. defense industrial base cannot sustain a protracted war and that the margin of U.S. technological superiority will diminish as a war continues. China’s defense mobilization system offers advantages in such a conflict.
E. Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Doctrine
United States
The U.S. possesses nuclear deterrence capabilities, and its nuclear doctrine allows for the use of nuclear weapons in certain circumstances, including in response to an invasion or attack on its own or allied territory. The U.S. is developing hypersonic missiles capable of carrying strategic payloads (including nerve agents and nuclear weapons) that can strike targets with extreme speed and maneuverability. The U.S. is developing space-based interceptors and layered defense capabilities to counter hypersonic, ballistic, and cruise missile threats.
China
China officially adheres to a “no first use” (NFU) nuclear policy, meaning it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction unless attacked by them. However, U.S. defense analysts contend that China is shifting away from a strict NFU strategy towards a “launch on warning” (LOW) posture, which would allow it to retaliate upon detection of incoming warheads without waiting for them to strike Chinese targets first. China is constructing 320 new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos and developing new ICBM variants and advanced strategic delivery systems. China has also expanded its dual-capable DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile force and is refitting its Type 094 ballistic missile submarines to carry the longer-range JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile. Additionally, China has recently reassigned an operational nuclear mission to some of its bombers, equipped with air-launched ballistic missiles that might have nuclear capability. China possesses the “world’s leading hypersonic missile arsenal,” including the DF-17 and DF-27, capable of flying at over Mach 5 and maneuvering to evade missile defense systems.
The modernization of China’s nuclear arsenal is accelerating and expanding. The Pentagon estimates that China’s nuclear warhead stockpile will reach around 600 by 2025 and exceed 1,000 by 2030. The expansion of China’s nuclear forces aims to provide greater escalation control and deter U.S. intervention.
F. Overall Combat Capability and Adaptability
United States
The U.S. military possesses unparalleled global reach and technological superiority, serving as a pillar of Western military doctrine. The U.S. maintains an unmatched advantage in air power, with a total aircraft count (13,043) far exceeding China’s (3,309). While the U.S. Navy has been surpassed by China in terms of ship numbers, it operates 11 aircraft carriers compared to China’s 2. The U.S. has significant advantages in intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), and command, control, communications, and computers (C4) systems.
However, the current state of the U.S. defense industrial base reflects policymakers’ preference for “just-in-time” supply chains and lowest-cost contracts, which limits its ability to rapidly surge production in a major conflict. The U.S.’s reliance on China for critical mineral supply chains is a significant vulnerability that could impact its ability to manufacture advanced military systems.
China
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is undergoing unprecedented military modernization, developing a large and advanced arsenal of nuclear, conventional, cyber, and space capabilities. The PLA Navy (PLAN) is the world’s largest navy by fleet size, with over 370 combat vessels, projected to reach 395 by 2025. China surpasses the U.S. in land forces, tanks, and artillery numbers. China is rapidly advancing in cutting-edge technologies such as AI, hypersonics, advanced missiles, and space-based capabilities.
China’s military modernization is supported by a world-class defense industrial base, making it nearly self-sufficient in shipbuilding and the production of various naval combatants. However, the PLA lacks recent combat experience, and its maintenance capabilities for high-intensity operations are untested in real combat. China still relies on external sources for critical high-tech areas such as aero-engines and advanced semiconductors.
VIII. Conclusion
In a hypothetical “hot war” scenario, both the United States and China possess unique national power advantages and significant vulnerabilities that would profoundly influence the course and outcome of the conflict.
The United States’ strengths lie in its robust network of allies and global influence, enabling it to forge broad international coalitions and project power worldwide. The depth of its financial markets and the dollar’s status as a reserve currency provide immense financing capabilities, though rising national debt could be a long-term constraint. The U.S. maintains a lead in technological innovation, particularly in AI and advanced military technologies. However, the primary challenges for the U.S. are its domestic political polarization, which could undermine national unity and the ability to sustain public support in a prolonged conflict. Furthermore, the hollowing out of its manufacturing base and reliance on global supply chains make it vulnerable to supply disruptions in wartime.
China’s strengths are its vast industrial production capacity, as the global manufacturing hub, capable of rapidly producing military and civilian goods on a large scale. Its highly centralized political system allows for swift decision-making and resource mobilization. China dominates in critical mineral resources like rare earths and is actively developing energy and food strategic reserves to enhance self-sufficiency. Additionally, China is rapidly advancing in cyber and space warfare capabilities and possesses a world-leading hypersonic missile arsenal. However, China’s vulnerabilities include its economic structure’s reliance on exports, making it susceptible to economic shocks from sanctions and blockades, which could trigger internal social unrest. Its financial system, while state-controlled, faces deep structural issues like a real estate crisis and local government debt. Moreover, its reliance on external sources for certain high-end technologies (e.g., advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment and aero-engines) and the potential for insufficient internal feedback mechanisms due to information control could limit its adaptability and resilience in a prolonged, complex conflict.
In conclusion, a “hot war” between the U.S. and China would be extremely costly, likely resulting in immense economic, social, and human casualties for both sides. The duration of such a conflict could extend beyond traditional expectations, with an ever-present risk of nuclear escalation. Both nations would attempt to exploit each other’s weaknesses; for instance, the U.S. might target China’s export-oriented economy and technological dependencies through economic sanctions and supply chain disruptions, while China might seek to undermine U.S. industrial and military production by restricting critical mineral exports and leveraging cyber/space warfare capabilities. Ultimately, the trajectory of the conflict would depend on each side’s ability to effectively leverage its core strengths while mitigating its inherent vulnerabilities.
